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The Failure of Mitigation? 
Robert J. Smith,* Sophie Cull, and Zoë Robinson** 
A vast literature details the crimes that condemned inmates commit, but very little is 
known about the social histories of these capital offenders. For example, how many 
offenders possessed mitigating characteristics that demonstrate intellectual or 
psychological deficits comparable to those shared by classes of offenders categorically 
excluded from capital punishment? Did these executed offenders suffer from 
intellectual disability, youthfulness, mental illness, or childhood trauma? The problem 
with this state of affairs is that the personal characteristics of the defendant can render 
the death penalty an excessive punishment regardless of the characteristics of the crime. 
This Article begins to fill the mitigation knowledge gap by describing the social 
histories of the last hundred offenders executed in America. Scouring state and federal 
court records, this Article documents the presence of significant mitigation evidence for 
eighty-seven percent of executed offenders. Though only a first step, our findings 
suggest the failure of the Supreme Court’s mitigation project to ensure the only 
offenders subjected to a death sentence are those with “a consciousness materially more 
depraved” than that of the typical murderer. Indeed, the inverse appears to be true: the 
vast majority of executed offenders possess significant functional deficits that rival—
and perhaps outpace—those associated with intellectual impairment and juvenile 
status; defendants that the Court has categorically excluded from death eligibility. 
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Introduction 
The Eighth Amendment limits the death penalty to those offenders 
with “a consciousness materially more depraved” than that of the typical 
murderer.1 Offenders who meet this threshold for death eligibility are 
identified as having “extreme culpability.”2 Extreme culpability marks 
one end of a death-eligibility spectrum. The perpetrator of the typical 
murder occupies the other end.3 To elevate the culpability of the 
perpetrator beyond that of the typical murderer, the prosecution must 
prove the existence of at least one aggravating factor such as the existence 
of multiple victims or the heinousness of the offense.4 To reduce 
culpability, capital defendants introduce mitigating evidence such as 
intellectual impairments, youthfulness, severe mental illness, and chronic 
1. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reversing a
death sentence due to insufficient proof that the defendant had “a consciousness materially more 
depraved than that of any person guilty of murder”).  
2. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(explaining that the death penalty “must be limited to those offenders . . . whose extreme culpability 
makes them the most deserving of execution”). 
3. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (noting that “the culpability of the average
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State”). 
4. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element 
of a greater offense the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital 
Punishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 345, 397–430 (1998) (listing aggravating factors by state).  
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childhood trauma.5 Aggravating and mitigating factors, then, drive 
movement along the death-eligibility spectrum.6 The process of jurors 
considering mitigating factors—including the circumstances of the crime 
and the background and character of the offender—is known as 
individualized sentencing.7 
Intellectually disabled8 and juvenile offenders are no longer located 
on the death-eligibility spectrum.9 Instead, because intellectually disabled 
and juvenile offenders have diminished culpability relative to the typical 
death-ineligible murderer, these classes of offenders are treated as 
outliers; they are exempted from capital punishment altogether.10 The 
exemption from capital punishment granted to particular classes of 
offenders is known as categorical exemption.11 Taken together, 
individualized sentencing and categorical exemption are mitigation-
facilitating procedures that allow jurors to make death determinations 
for offenders situated along the death-eligibility spectrum, but not for 
classes of offenders characterized by diminished culpability.12 
This Article asks whether the Court’s mitigation-facilitating 
procedures succeed in limiting capital punishment to only those offenders 
5. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression
Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 Or. L. Rev. 631, 658–83 (2004) (listing mitigating 
factors by state). 
6. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 659 (1990) (explaining that the Court “upheld against Eighth 
Amendment challenge” death penalty statutes “which, in varying forms, require[] the sentencer to 
consider certain specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching its decision”). 
7. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
8. As recently as 2013, the Supreme Court employed the term “mental retardation” to describe
those individuals with intellectual disabilities. See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A., 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 (2013). 
However, in the recent decision of Hall v. Florida, the Court aligned its terminology with that used in 
the medical community. See Hall v. Florida, No. 12-10882, 2014 WL 2178332, at *3 (U.S. May 27, 
2014). Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that “[p]revious opinions of this Court have 
employed the term ‘mental retardation.’ This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe 
the identical phenomenon.” Id. The Court’s shift in terminology has been widely applauded. See, e.g., 
Tony Mauro, Supreme Court’s Use of ‘Intellectual Disability’ Wins Praise, Legal Times (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202657038598/Supreme+Courts+Use+of+Intellectu
al+Disability+Wins+Praise%3Fmcode=1202615034968&curindex=2&curpage=ALL. 
9. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306 (finding that intellectually disabled offenders are excluded due to their 
“disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses”); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 569–74 (2005) (juveniles are excluded due to their “lack [of] maturity,” “transitory, less 
fixed [identities]” and “underdeveloped sense of responsibility”). 
10. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574. 
11. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (citation omitted) (“[I]n cases turning on the
characteristics of the offender, the Court has adopted categorical rules prohibiting the death penalty 
for defendants who committed their crimes before the age of 18 or whose intellectual functioning is in 
a low range.”). 
12. Categorical exemptions also prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on defendants
convicted of non-homicide offenses. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (prohibiting the death 
penalty for adult rape); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008) (prohibiting the death penalty for 
the rape of a child). Those defendants convicted of murder who did not kill or act with reckless 
indifference are also exempt from the death penalty. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
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with extreme culpability. Specifically we ask: How many offenders 
possessed mitigating characteristics that demonstrate intellectual or 
psychological deficits comparable to those shared by classes of offenders 
categorically excluded from capital punishment? Did these executed 
offenders suffer from intellectual disability, youthfulness, mental illness or 
childhood trauma? By illustrating that the social histories of the last 
hundred offenders executed in the United States exhibit the presence of 
extensive and widespread mitigation, this project is the first step toward 
building a knowledge base of the social histories of America’s condemned 
inmates. 
But first a note about methodology. Our aim here is modest. We 
hope to give pause to those scholars and judges who presume that Atkins 
v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons winnowed down the death-eligibility
pool to those offenders with the most extreme personal culpability. We 
do not aim to prove that any particular executed offenders possessed lesser 
culpability than that of the typical categorically excludable offender 
(though it might be the case that some of the offenders we identity did 
possess reduced culpability comparative to a typical Atkins or Roper 
excludable offender). Nor do we mean to suggest that the evidence that we 
were able to gather from the available records (which are often sparse, due 
to, for example, factors including poor representation, inadequate funding 
for penalty phase or post-conviction investigation, or where defendant 
prohibited his counsel from presenting mitigating evidence) is sufficient to 
prove mitigated culpability. Rather, our aim is to begin a scholarly 
conversation about the functionality of the Supreme Court’s mitigation 
project. To that end, we err on the side of overinclusion of mitigation 
evidence. Where available, we cite to a state or federal court appellate 
opinion. In the absence of mitigation evidence in the appellate record, we 
include information from the following sources in descending order of 
preference, where preference ordering is based on the credibility of the 
source: a finding relayed by an expert, regardless of where that finding is 
articulated; a news account; a pleading filed by a defendant. When we 
rely on pleadings, which we do very sparingly, such reliance is noted in 
the footnote and we also note any evidence cited in the parallel pleadings 
filed by the prosecution that tends to contradict the claim articulated by 
the defendant.  
Part I of this Article explains the requirement of extreme culpability 
and describes the procedures designed to enforce it. Part II examines the 
mitigation histories of the last one hundred executed offenders in 
America. It reveals that the overwhelming majority of executed offenders 
had intellectual and psychological deficits that rivaled—and sometimes 
outpaced—those associated with intellectual disability and juvenile status. 
Part III connects the dots: it raises the inference that procedures entrusted 
to enforce the extreme culpability requirement might not be sufficient. 
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I.  The Extreme Culpability Requirement and the Procedures 
Designed to Enforce It 
This Part begins by detailing the extreme culpability requirement and 
how the Supreme Court characterizes offenders who possess it. It then 
describes the two procedures designed to ensure that only defendants with 
extreme culpability are executed—individualized sentencing and 
categorical exemption. The framework that we construct here provides 
context for the mitigation histories discussed in Part II. 
A. The Extreme Culpability Requirement 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishments, which in 
capital cases, limits the death penalty to offenders who commit “a narrow 
category of the most serious crimes” and “whose extreme culpability 
makes them the most deserving of execution.”13 In Coker v. Georgia, for 
instance, the Court found the death penalty to be an excessive punishment 
for the rape of an adult woman because rape, though a very serious 
crime, does not compare in terms of “moral depravity” with murder.14 
More recently, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, which involved the rape of a 
child, the Court held that the death penalty is an excessive punishment 
for any civilian crime that does not result in death.15 After Kennedy, then, 
only homicide crimes are death-eligible. 
But not all homicide crimes are death-eligible. The perpetrator of 
the typical murder does not reach the extreme culpability threshold.16 To 
cross the extreme culpability threshold, the prosecution must prove the 
existence of at least one factor that aggravates the murder.17 Common 
examples of aggravating factors include the heinousness of the offense, 
the number of victims, and the prior record of the offender.18 Taken 
13. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (“Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms
of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, 
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”). 
15. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447 (“Difficulties in administering the penalty to ensure against its arbitrary 
and capricious application require adherence to a rule reserving its use, at this stage of evolving standards 
and in cases of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take the life of the victim.”). 
16. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“[T]he culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State.”). 
17. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585 (2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of 
an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”). 
18. Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 397–430 (listing aggravating factors). The Court has given its
blessing to a variety of state legislative attempts to define aggravated homicide in a manner that 
captures in its net only the most culpable offenders. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) 
(asserting that “the narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment” can be met either 
by legislative narrowing of “the definition of capital offenses” or “the legislature may more broadly 
define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the 
penalty phase”). Many states permit the prosecution to prove aggravated culpability by reference to 
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together, the narrowing of death-eligible crimes to homicide offenses and 
the characterization of the extremely culpable offender as one with a 
“consciousness materially more depraved” than that of the perpetrator 
of the typical murder are best thought of as the velocity necessary to 
elevate the culpability of the offender.19 The next Subpart focuses on how 
mitigation evidence operates as a downward pressure that prevents the 
State from proving that the offender meets the extreme culpability 
threshold. 
B. The Procedures Designed to Ensure the Extreme Culpability 
Requirement 
The Court has enacted two procedures to ensure that insufficiently 
culpable offenders are not executed: individualized sentencing and 
categorical exemption. This Article addresses them in turn. 
The first requirement—individualized sentencing—is a process 
requirement. Defendants are permitted to introduce—and jurors are 
required to consider—(almost) any evidence about the character or 
background of the offender that suggests that death is not an appropriate 
punishment.20 This broad definition of mitigation includes factors such as 
remorse, lack of any criminal record, and a lesser role in the crime than 
codefendants, among myriad other factors.21 These factors do not directly 
impact moral culpability. This Article focuses instead on the subset of 
mitigating factors that demonstrate intellectual and psychological deficits 
directly related to the moral culpability of the offender. These factors 
include: intellectual impairments, youthfulness, mental illness, and 
childhood trauma.22 Each factor is correlated with diminished 
functioning—some factors suggest impaired reasoning skills, poor 
judgment, or suggestibility; others suggest decreased impulse control or 
enhanced emotional volatility; each of them suggest a downward 
the defendant’s previous acts of serious violence. Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 378. Other factors 
involve the heightened “depravity” or “cold-blooded” or “pitiless” nature of the offense in 
comparison to other homicides. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471–75 (1993) (affirming the 
constitutionality of an Idaho statutory aggravator that required the jury to find that the defendant is a 
“cold-blooded, pitiless slayer”). Still others focus on the elevated dangerousness of the offender. 
Kirchmeier, supra note 4, at 378–79. Indeed, there is such a proliferation of aggravating circumstances 
that commentators have noted that aggravators do not truly narrow the types of homicide that result 
in death-eligibility. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens 
and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1607, 1658 (2006) (noting that death-eligibility 
is too broad and calling for “additional narrowing”). 
19. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (allowing every defendant to introduce “any aspect
of [his] character or record” that he “proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”). 
21. Kirchmeier, supra note 5, at 658–83. 
22. See infra Part II (describing the characteristics of childhood trauma, mental illness,
youthfulness, and intellectual impairment). 
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departure from extreme culpability.23 To be clear, these mitigating factors 
do not excuse the crime. Instead, they provide capital juries with the 
necessary context for deciding whether a death sentence is appropriate. 
Individualized sentencing serves as a primary protection for ensuring 
that only offenders with extreme culpability are executed.24 The integrity 
of the procedure depends on the ability of jurors to sort the perpetrator of 
the typical murderer from the comparatively few murders committed by a 
perpetrator with extreme culpability.25 Though the jury is entrusted to 
determine whether a death sentence is appropriate for any offender 
located on the death-eligibility spectrum—which, again, ranges from the 
perpetrator of the typical murder to the murderer with extreme 
culpability—the Court finds this culpability-sorting task to be impossibly 
difficult when the defendant is intellectually disabled or a juvenile.26 
Hence the second procedural protection used to ensure that only 
offenders with extreme culpability are executed: categorical exemption. 
Classes of offenders that are characterized by their diminished 
culpability receive blanket exemption from capital punishment.27 For 
example, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court exempted intellectually disabled 
offenders because the typical intellectually disabled offender has 
“diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the 
reactions of others.”28 Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court exempted 
juveniles because the typical juvenile offender has a “lack of maturity and 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” tends to engage in “impetuous 
and ill-considered actions and decisions,” is more “vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure,” and has a “more transitory, less fixed” identity than the typical 
adult.29 Thus, intellectually disabled and juvenile offenders are defined in 
part by their diminished moral culpability. 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (citation omitted) (“[T]he fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”). 
25. Id. at 305 (noting that “death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment” and
stating that “[b]ecause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”). 
26. See supra note 9 (citing the cases in which the Court created categorical exemptions for
intellectually disabled and juvenile offenders). 
27. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (intellectually disabled offenders); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (juveniles). 
28. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; see Hall v. Florida, No. 12-10882, 2014 WL 2178332, at *16 (U.S. May
27, 2014) (holding that states cannot use fixed IQ scores to determine death eligibility).  
29. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569–75. 
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Diminished culpability is not an argument from determinism, but 
rather one that recognizes that physiological and cognitive deficits 
constrain and shape choices.30 “Diminished” has a reference point: it 
means diminished culpability in relation to that of the perpetrator of the 
typical murder.31 Because the perpetrator of the typical murder is at the 
low-end of the death-eligibility spectrum, and intellectually disabled and 
juvenile offenders are less culpable still, classes of offenders with 
diminished culpability are treated as outliers—they are not on the death-
eligibility spectrum. This is not to claim that it is impossible for any 
intellectually disabled or juvenile offender to have the requisite extreme 
culpability, but rather that because such an offender is so exceedingly 
rare, intellectually disabled or juvenile offenders as a class “cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”32 
This Part detailed both the extreme culpability requirement and the 
mitigation-facilitating procedures designed to ensure that the death 
penalty functions properly. The next Part details the mitigation histories 
of the hundred most recently executed offenders in the United States. It 
raises an inference that the mitigation-facilitating procedures are not 
preventing the execution of offenders who do not possess the extreme 
culpability contemplated by the Eighth Amendment. 
II. The Mitigation Histories of the Last One Hundred Executed
Offenders 
This Part examines the mitigation histories of the last one hundred
executed offenders in the United States.33 We compiled these histories to 
construct a portrait of who is being executed despite the individualized 
sentencing and categorical exemption frameworks.34 We considered only 
30. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (“Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by 
definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to 
abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, 
and to understand the reactions of others.”). 
31. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571 (“Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s
moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution 
is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe 
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, 
by reason of youth and immaturity.”). 
32. Id. at 569. 
33. We examined a total of 102 cases but excluded two defendants from our analysis because they
refused to introduce mitigation evidence in their respective cases. See Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 
1249–51 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that at trial Kemp did not seek to prove the existence of any statutory 
mitigating factors at sentencing; Kemp attempted to prove the existence of non-statutory mitigation 
but did not offer any evidence or present witnesses); South Dakota v. Robert, 820 N.W. 2d 136, 140 
(S.D. 2012) (noting that Robert instructed “his counsel not to present mitigating evidence on his 
behalf” because he wished to be executed). 
34. We chose the one hundred most recently executed offenders for three reasons: First, by
definition, there is no future proceeding from which new information will displace current knowledge 
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mitigating circumstances that demonstrate intellectual and psychological 
deficits that compare to those that intellectually disabled and juvenile 
offenders possess, namely: intellectual disability, youthfulness, mental 
illness, and childhood trauma.35 Our examination reveals that the vast 
majority of executed offenders—eighty-seven percent—fell into at least 
one mitigation category; and most offenders fell into two or more 
categories.36 This Part begins by considering each of the major mitigation 
types. 
A. Intellectual Impairment 
Intellectual impairment is an umbrella term that encompasses both 
intellectual disability and borderline functioning that falls just outside of 
intellectual disability definitions. One-third of the last hundred executed 
offenders were burdened by intellectual disability, borderline intellectual 
functioning, or traumatic brain injury—a similarly debilitating intellectual 
impairment.37 
The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (“AAIDD”), an interdisciplinary organization of professionals 
concerned with intellectual disability, defines intellectual disability as “a 
disability characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual 
functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many everyday social 
and practical skills.”38 The AAIDD suggests that a sub-76 IQ suggests 
of whether the defendant deserved death. Second, and relatedly, mitigation information is often not 
adequately documented until the completion of the federal habeas and the clemency process. Third, 
we would expect executed offenders to be the most culpable. These individuals met state requirements 
for death-eligibility, a prosecutor decided to charge the case capitally, a jury returned a death verdict, 
no appellate court reversed the death sentence, and no executive figure or body granted clemency. In 
other words, if these offenders possess mitigated culpability, then we have every reason to believe that 
death row inmates generally possess similar—indeed, more pronounced—mitigation histories. We 
sourced information from state supreme court decisions, state and federal habeas petitions, state and 
federal habeas rulings, petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, clemency petitions, 
news articles, state department of corrections websites, and online databases of death row defendants.  
35. These categories will be discussed in more detail below. The following are examples of mitigating 
factors that fall into these categories: (1) Mental illness: post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), alcohol 
and drug abuse/dependency, bi-polar disorder, major depression, schizophrenia, hallucinations, psychosis, 
delusions, personality disorders, suicidal ideation, and self-harm; (2) Intellectual impairments: adaptive 
deficits, head injury, brain damage, and low IQ; (3) Age: under twenty-five years old; (4) Childhood 
trauma: death of caregivers and immediate family members, sexual assault, physical abuse, criminal 
neglect, poverty, exposure to interpersonal violence, and homelessness. 
36. The Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida—holding that states cannot rely solely on a fixed IQ
score to conclusively determine death eligibility—came down when this Article was in final 
production. See Hall v. Florida, No. 12-10882, 2014 WL 2178332, at *16 (U.S. May 27, 2014). The idea 
that states need to take a more functional approach to assessing intellectual impairment to guard 
against retributive mismatch is consistent with our thesis.  
37. Id. 
38. Am. Ass’n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual
Disability, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.Uvm_pXddU_M (last visited June 1, 2014) 
(emphasis omitted).  
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intellectual disability.39 The Atkins Court did not explicitly adopt the 
AAIDD definition of intellectual disability in its decision to exclude 
intellectually disabled offenders from capital punishment, but rather 
chose to divest the responsibility of defining intellectual disability to state 
legislatures.40 The result has been a lack of uniformity among the states 
about how intellectual disability is defined, and therefore, about which 
offenders are exempt from the death penalty.41 Eight percent of executed 
offenders received at least one sub-70 IQ score.42 This is the range of 
intellectual functioning that the Atkins Court described as consisting of 
offenders with “diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand the reactions of others.”43  
Consider Elroy Chester.44 No one disputes that Elroy Chester was 
intellectually disabled under the standard clinical definitions of intellectual 
disability despite the fact that Texas executed him on June 12, 2013. The 
Texas Department of Corrections had determined that Chester had an IQ 
of 69.45 In fact, Chester scored under 70 in four of the five full-scale IQ 
tests that he took from the age of seven onwards.46 He attended special 
education classes from the third through twelfth grades, never learning at 
an academic level higher than the third grade.47 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals noted that, “even the State’s expert witness . . . 
acknowledged that a person with [Chester’s scores] . . . would be correctly 
diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded.”48 Yet despite these findings—and 
the fact that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice had previously 
enrolled Chester in its Mentally Retarded Offenders Program49—Texas 
executed Chester. The inability of the Atkins exemption to halt the 
execution of Elroy Chester (and other executed offenders like him) raises 
39. Id. 
40. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (leaving “to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional 
restriction upon their execution of sentences”). 
41. See Alexis Krulish Dowling, Note, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court’s
Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 773, 790 (2003). See generally John H. 
Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death 
Penalty Cases, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 689 (2009). 
42. See infra Table 1 (listing Gayland Charles Bradford, Elmer Leon Carroll, Elroy Chester,
Robert Wayne Harris, Rickie Lynn Lewis, Milton Wuzael Mathis, William Gerald Mitchell, and 
Marvin Wilson). 
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
44. Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2011). 
45. Id. at 363. 
46. Id. at 353. 
47. Id. at 355. 
48. Ex parte Chester, No. AP-75037, 2007 WL 602607, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007). 
49. Chester, 666 F.3d at 363. 
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serious questions about the effectiveness of Atkins in the absence of a clear 
Court-sanctioned definition of intellectual disability. 
An IQ between 71 and 84 is categorized as borderline intellectual 
functioning.50 Only nine percent of the general population has an IQ of 
80 or below.51 Fifteen percent of our sample group had IQ scores below 
80 recorded in their mitigation histories, with half of these receiving 
scores in the 60s.52 The difference between an offender with an IQ score 
that renders him categorically ineligible for the death penalty and an 
offender with borderline intellectual functioning is often negligible.53 
Relative to the typical adult, borderline mental deficiency—like 
intellectual disability—diminishes defendants’ capacities to understand 
and process information, communicate, abstract from mistakes and learn 
from experience, engage in logical reasoning, control impulses, and 
understand the reactions of others.54 Thus, the line between offenders 
exempted under Atkins and offenders with borderline intellectual 
deficiency is an arbitrary one—both classes of offenders possess 
diminished culpability relative to the typical adult. 
Many states base their definitions of intellectual disability, at least in 
part on the American Psychological Associations’ Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual on Mental Disorders (“DSM”). The most recent version 
of the DSM, the DSM-5, which was released in 2013, conspicuously 
removed IQ test scores from the diagnostic criteria.55 The DSM-5 supports 
the delineation of skill types or “domains” in which intellectual disabled 
people will experience impairments.56 IQ scores remain in the text 
description of the intellectual disability but the American Psychological 
Association has taken pains to ensure that IQ scores “are not 
overemphasized as the defining factor of a person’s overall ability, 
without adequately considering functioning levels.”57 DSM-5 notes that 
its caution about overreliance on IQ scores “is especially important in 
forensic cases” because IQ scores that fall outside traditional definitions 
of intellectual disability can mask functional intellectual deficits on par 
with those of individuals with lower IQ scores.58 Thus, it is reasonable to 
50. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 684 
(4th ed. 1994). 
51. See generally Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (4th ed. 2004) (presenting an IQ
classification table that reflects that the distribution of population with IQ scores below 80 is 8.9%). 
52. See infra Table 1 (listing Daniel Lee Bedford, Charles Henry Blue, Gayland Charles
Bradford, Elmer Leon Carroll, Clarence Carter, Elroy Chester, Guadalupe Esparza, Rodney Gray, 
Robert Wayne Harris, Yokamon Laneal Hearn, Rickie Lynn Lewis, Milton Wuzael Mathis, William 
Gerald Mitchell, Jeffrey Demond Williams, and Marvin Wilson). 
53. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DSM-5 Intellectual Disability Fact Sheet 1–2 (2013). 
54. Id. at 1. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1–2. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 2. 
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assume that at least some executed offenders with sub-80 IQs that did not 
qualify under the DSM-4’s definition of intellectual disability would 
qualify under the DSM-5. Moreover, even those offenders who would not 
qualify under either version of the DSM nonetheless possess significant 
intellectual impairments relative to the typical adult. 
Other executed offenders had a traumatic brain injury, which can 
result from birth defects or head injuries that onset before or after age 
eighteen.59 Traumatic brain injury is strongly associated with “attention 
deficits,” “memory deficits,” “irritability or anger,” and “uninhibited or 
impulsive” behavior.60 These injuries often do not qualify under Atkins 
because intellectual disability must onset before the age of eighteen in a 
most jurisdictions.61 Consider James DeRosa.62 He had an injury in the 
left frontal lobe of his brain that interfered with his ability to reason and 
caused him to act impulsively and lose control easily.63 It is unlikely that 
the typical seventeen-year-old would have greater impulsivity problems 
than the typical person with traumatic brain injury; thus no more likely 
that the person with a brain injury would account for the risk of execution 
any more than would the typical juvenile. Brain injury is also subject to the 
double-edged sword problem: brain injuries should be mitigating, but they 
run the risk of aggravating the culpability calculus since increased 
impulsivity and decreased self-control suggest future dangerousness. 
Table 1: Defendants Who Demonstrated Evidence of Intellectual 
Disability 
Daniel Lee Bedford64 Charles Henry Blue65 Gayland Charles 
Bradford66 
59. See infra Table 1 (listing Richard Cobb, Daniel Cook, Robert Jackson Samuel Villegas Lopez, 
Benny Joe Stevens, and Richard Stokley). 
60. Ctrs. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Traumatic Brain Injury in
Prisons and Jails: An Unrecognized Problem 2 (2013) (noting that among male offenders, 
traumatic brain injuries are highly correlated with violent offenses). 
61. See supra note 38. 
62. DeRosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1212–18 (10th Cir. 2012). 
63. Id. at 1213–14. 
64. Neuropsychological testing revealed that Bedford was moderately impaired in his memory
abilities and in language skills and demonstrated deficits in his day-to-day functioning skills. See State 
of Ohio Adult Parole Auth., In re: Daniel Lee Bedford, OSP #A181-997: Clemency Report 8 
(2011), available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/Public/bedford_danielClemency.pdf. He scored 70 on an 
IQ test when he was thirteen and 76 on an IQ test when he was thirty-six. Id. at 9. A specialist in 
neuropsychiatry diagnosed Bedford with mild intellectual disability. Id. 
65. The Doctor’s diagnosis determined that Carl Blue’s IQ lay between 70 and 80. Blue v. Thaler, 
665 F.3d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 2011). 
66. State prison records indicate Bradford had an IQ score of 68 and he never completed his high
school diploma. Bradford v. Cockrell, No. 3:00-2709, 2002 WL 32158719, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 
2002); Brandon Scott, Bradford Executed for 1988 Murder of Dallas Security Guard, Huntsville Item 
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Elmer Leon Carroll67 Clarence Carter68 Elroy Chester69 
Richard Aaron Cobb70 Daniel Wayne Cook71 James DeRosa72 
Guadalupe Esparza73 Frank Garcia74 Rodney Gray75 
Robert Wayne Harris76 Yokamon Laneal Hearn77 Bobby Hines78 
(June 1, 2011), http://itemonline.com/local/x962127241/Bradford-executed-for-1988-murder-of-Dallas-
security-guard (“Bradford never received a high school diploma.”). 
67. A mental health expert testified that Carroll suffered from organic brain damage that affected 
his intellectual and cognitive capacities. Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 615 (Fla. 2002). He was found 
to have learning disabilities and his IQ was determined to be 81. Id. 
68. A forensic psychologist concluded that Carter suffered from organic brain dysfunction. Carter 
v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 528 (6th Cir. 2006). A neuropsychologist found that Carter had difficulty
understanding the spoken word and struggled with complex information. See id. Carter’s IQ was in the 
range for borderline intellectual disability. See id. at 529; see also State of Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 
In re: Clarence Carter, OSP #A1213-146, Death Penalty Clemency 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/public/ClarenceCarter2011.pdf. 
69. Chester took five full-scale IQ tests; he scored under 70 four times, and even the Texas
Department of Corrections classified Chester as possessing a 69 IQ. See infra Part II.A; Chester v. 
Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2011); Ex parte Chester, No. AP-75,037, 2007 WL 602607, at *3 
(Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2007). 
70. Expert testimony revealed that Cobb suffered from brain damage as a result of his mother’s
alcohol and drug use while she was pregnant with him. Cobb v. Thaler, No. 2:08-0123, 2011 WL 
672333, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2011). 
71. Cook was diagnosed as suffering from organic brain damage due to his mother’s dependence
on drugs and alcohol during her pregnancy. See Jason Lewis, Daniel Cook, Convicted Murderer With 
Tortured Past, Executed in Florence, Phx. New Times Blogs (Aug. 8, 2012, 3:55 PM), 
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/2012/08/daniel_cook_convicted_murderer.php; see also 
Cook v. Ryan, No. 97-00146, 2012 WL 2798789, at *10 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012). 
72. DeRosa had an acquired brain injury. DeRosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1214 (10th Cir. 
2012). The left frontal lobe of his brain had a deficiency that impacted his behavior by causing him to 
be impulsive and lose control easily, as well as interfering with his ability to reason. Id. at 1213. 
73. Esparza was in special education as a child and failed the ninth grade and the General
Educational Development Test. Esparza v. Thaler, 408 F. App’x 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2010). He had a 
history of adaptive problems in his childhood. Id. Esparza scored 71 on an IQ test and multiple experts 
concluded that he was intellectually disabled or mildly intellectually disabled. Id. at 790–94. 
74. Garcia had “serious intellectual deficiencies.” Petitioner’s Second Amended Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus & Brief in Support Thereof at 96, Garcia v. Thaler, No. 08-0062, 2009 WL 
4931069 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2009). He was a sub-standard student, and was believed to have suffered 
organic brain injury as a child due to a disability that regularly caused him to fall and hit his head. Id. 
75. Gray’s IQ was disputed but test results put it between 74 and 80. Gray v. Epps, No. 4:04-0234, 
2008 WL 4793796, at *33–35 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 27, 2008). He was held back in the third and ninth grades 
and was in special education in the fourth grade. Id. at *31, *34. 
76. Harris had an IQ of 68 and an “an impaired intelligence level.” Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Texas 
Executes Robert Wayne Harris, L.A. Times (Sept. 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2012/sep/20/nation/la-na-nn-harris-execution-20120920; Ramirez Domingo, Jr., Brother Pleads for Life 
of Man Convicted in Carwash Deaths: A Forensic Psychologist and a Psychiatrist Detail the Troubled 
Past of Robert Wayne Harris, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Sept. 29, 2000, at 8. 
77. Hearn had Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and his parents were cognitively disabled. Amnesty Int’l, 
Senseless Killing After Senseless Killing: Texas Inmate with Mental Disability Claim Facing 
Execution for Murder Committed as Teenager 11 (2012). He was consistently described as “slow”, 
a “follower,” “gullible,” “easily influenced,” and “impressionable” by friends, relatives, and former 
teachers during his childhood. Id. His IQ was 74. Id. He had poor grades and failed the first grade. In 
re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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Henry Curtis Jackson79 Robert Jackson80 Shannon Johnson81 
Richard Albert Leavitt82 Rickie Lynn Lewis83 Samuel Villegas
Lopez84 
Milton Wuzael Mathis85 William Gerald Mitchell86 Robert Moormann87 
George Ochoa88 Eddie Duvall Powell89 Benny Joe Stevens90 
78. Hines had a diagnosed learning disability and adaptive behavioral deficits that suggested
impaired functioning. See Jordan Smith, Two More in Line for Death Penalty, Austin Chron. 
(Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2012-10-19/two-more-in-line-for-death-penalty; 
see also Ex parte Hines, No. WR-40347-02, 2005 WL 3119030, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2005). 
79. Jackson suffered from a complex partial seizure disorder and possibly a brain dysfunction
associated with multiple episodes of brain trauma. Jackson v. State, 860 So.2d 653, 669–70 (Miss. 
2003). He was deemed “intellectually slow.” See id. at 669; see also Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 
1232 (Miss. 1996) (direct appeal). 
80. A neuropsychologist found that Jackson suffered from brain damage. State v. Jackson,
No. 92003717DI, 2008 WL 5048424, at *9 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).  
81. Johnson was diagnosed with a learning disability that affected “his ability to master basic
academics, such as reading and writing.” Delaware v. Johnson, No. 0609017045, 2008 WL 4140596, at 
*6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008). The trial court found this to be a mitigating factor in his case. Id. 
82. Scans of Leavitt’s brain revealed white matter that indicated a physical brain injury, thought to
have arisen because of “Leavitt’s premature birth, because of a childhood head injury he suffered in an 
accident, [or] because of inhalation of toxic fumes during employment.” See Petition for Commutation 
Richard A. Leavitt at 4, Leavitt v. Arave, 682 F.3d 1138 (2012) (Nos. 12-35427, 12-35450). 
83. Lewis’s IQ score was tested on numerous occasions, returning results as low as 59 and as high
as 79. Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 2012). 
84. Genetic heritage and acquired brain damage combined to leave Lopez with “crippling”
mental impairments. See Affidavit of George Woods, M.D. at 4, Lopez v. Stewart, No. 98-00072 
(2012). 
85. Mathis’s IQ was tested a number of times. In re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2007). He
received a score of 79 as a child, 62 in 2000, and 64 in 2005. Id. A Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice psychologist found Mathis to have a full-scale IQ of 62. Mathis v. Dretke, 124 F. App’x 865, 880 
(5th Cir. 2005). A mental health expert found his full-scale IQ to be 79. Id. A neurological expert 
performed tests on Mathis and found that he had frontal lobe brain damage. Id. at 881. 
86. Mitchell was diagnosed as mildly intellectually disabled more than once. Mitchell v. Epps,
2010 WL 1141126, at *22 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2010). Records indicated that he suffered from deficits in 
two or more areas of adaptive behavior, and that his condition had onset before he turned eighteen. 
Id. Mitchell’s IQ scores ranged from 65 to 83. Id. at *40–42. 
87. Moormann was placed in a school for intellectually disabled children. He was institutionalized 
at the age of fifteen and diagnosed with a chronic brain syndrome associated with birth trauma, 
intellectual disability, and behavioral reactions. Moormann was described by state hospital physicians 
as a “known mental defective” and otherwise characterized as intellectually disabled. Opening Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant at 9, Moormann v. Schriro, 628 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-99035); 
Moorman v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1005, 1113–14 (2010) (noting that Moormann’s trial counsel 
introduced the testimony of “two prison employees who had been acquainted with Moormann during 
his incarceration to testify about his good heavier in prison and his mental deficiencies” and rejecting a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where “[e]xtensive evidence of Moormann’s history of 
behavioral, mental, social, and emotional difficulties was presented at trial,” including “a letter from 
Moormann’s fourth grade teacher” that “provided a summary of Moormann’s difficulties as a child 
and student”). He was institutionalized at the age of fifteen and diagnosed with a chronic brain 
syndrome associated with birth trauma, intellectual disability, and behavioral reactions. Id. He was 
described by state hospital physicians as a “known mental defective” and otherwise characterized as 
intellectually disabled. Id. 
88. Ochoa was diagnosed as borderline intellectually disabled. Ochoa v. State, 963 P.2d 583, 604 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998). 
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Whether an offender is intellectually disabled, borderline 
intellectually deficient, or the bearer of a traumatic brain injury, each of 
these conditions is associated with significant functional deficits. These 
findings point to the problematic notion that courts should treat 
intellectual disability differently than other intellectual impairments. To 
further complicate matters, our findings illustrate that intellectual 
impairments often occur with serious mental illness: Sixteen percent of 
executed offenders fell into both the mental illness and intellectual 
impairment categories. It seems unreasonable to rationalize excluding an 
offender with a 70+ IQ, but not an offender with a sub-80 IQ and a severe 
mental illness. 
89. Powell was diagnosed as mildly intellectually disabled in the fifth grade. Powell v. Allen,
602 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2010). 
90. A psychologist testified during the sentencing phase of his trial that Stevens endured head
injuries at ages six, sixteen, and on the day of the crime. Memorandum Opinion & Order at 25–26, 
Stevens v. Epps, No. 2:04-0118 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2008), ECF No. 35, 2008 WL 423528. A 
neuropsychologist diagnosed Stevens with dysfunction from an old brain injury. Id. at 26. 
91. Stokley endured head injuries that, when combined with alcohol consumption, resulted in
moderate to severe impairments and an inability to control impulses. State v. Stokley, 898 P.2d 454, 
470 (Ariz. 1995). 
92. Taylor was in special education classes and spent time in a mental health facility during his
childhood. Supplemental Claims at 3, Taylor v. Dretke, No. 4:04-0150 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2005), ECF 
No. 33. A intellectual disability examiner for the State of Texas concluded that there was “indicta for 
the possible existence [of] mental retardation or other psychological and neuropsychological 
conditions” in Taylor’s records. Id. 
93. Welch suffered from blackouts and brain damage that made him more “susceptible to
aggressive impulses.” Welch v. Workman, 639 F.3d 980, 990 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting the testimony of 
an expert who reported that “Welch’s drug and alcohol abuse caused brain damage but his behavior 
could be managed with medication in a controlled environment”).  
94. “Williams showed developmental delays at an early age. He did not walk until he was sixteen
months old and did not speak until he was four years old.” Williams v. Dretke, No. H-04-2945, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34438, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2005). He was diagnosed as “emotionally disturbed” 
with a verbal IQ of 79, a performance IQ of 65, and a full scale IQ of 70 as a high school student. Id. at 
5. His performance score was within the intellectually disabled range, and his other scores were
borderline. Id. Based on this diagnosis, Williams was placed in a special education program. Id. 
95. At age forty-six, Wilson received an IQ score of 61—a score that gives him the distinction as
the Texas Atkins claimant executed with the lowest full-scale IQ not subject to expert dispute. Wilson 
v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2011). A court-appointed specialist in Wilson’s case
diagnosed him with intellectual disability. Id. The AAIDD filed an amicus brief in support of Wilson’s 
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court before his execution, noting that Texas’s use of 
the Briseño factors has rendered the constitutional ban on execution a virtual nullity for mildly retarded 
offenders like Wilson. Brief of American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wilson v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 81 (2012) (No. 12-5349), 2012 WL 
3277046, at *2. 
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B. Youthfulness 
Richard Cobb was born into a family laboring under severe 
dysfunction and mental illness.96 Cobb was born with brain damage 
because his mother abused alcohol and drugs while she was pregnant 
with him.97 A woman who eventually adopted Cobb and his brothers 
observed “serious emotional problems” in each of them.98 Cobb was 
arrested for murder when he was eighteen-years-old.99 It was Cobb’s 
codefendant, not Cobb, who engaged in rape during the course of the 
crime, shot the victim, and was later identified by surviving witnesses as 
the “leader” of the two perpetrators.100 Nevertheless, Cobb received the 
death penalty and was executed by the State of Texas on April 26, 
2012.101 Cobb was five months past his eighteenth birthday at the time of 
the crime for which he was put to death.102 
Table 2: Defendants of the Last 100 Executed Under Twenty-one at the 
Time of the Crime 
Beunka Adams103 Johnnie Baston104 Gayland Charles
Bradford105 
William Glenn Boyd106 Richard Aaron Cobb107 Andrew Allen Cook108 
Troy Davis109 Andrew DeYoung110 Yokamon Hearn111 
96. See generally Cobb v. Thaler, No. 2:08-0123, 2011 WL 672333 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011). 
97. Id. at *6. 
98. Id. 
99. Michael Graczyk, Richard Cobb Executed for Texas Store Abduction Slaying, Huffington 
Post (Apr. 25, 2013, 9:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/richard-cobb-executed-
for_n_3158818.html. 
100. Id. at *4. 
101. Graczyk, supra note 99. 
102. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Richard Aaron Cobb, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/cobbrichard.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 103. Nineteen years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Beunka Adams, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/adamsbeunka.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
104. Twenty years old. Baston v. Bagley, 420 F.3d 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 105. Twenty years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Gayland 
Bradford, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/bradfordgayland.jpg (last visited June 1, 
2014). 
 106. Twenty years old. See Clark Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney, William Glenn Boyd, 
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/boyd1245.htm (last visited June 1, 2014) (citing Ala. 
Dep’t of Corrections, Executions, http://www.doc.state.al.us/Executions.aspx). 
 107. Eighteen years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Richard Aaron 
Cobb, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/cobbrichard.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 108. Nineteen years old. See Kate Brumback, Andrew Allen Cook Executed For Georgia Murders 
He Confessed to FBI Agent Father, Huffington Post (Feb. 22, 2013, 3:50 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/22/andrew-allen-cook-executed_n_2741065.html (reporting 
that Cook was not arrested until he was twenty-two, two years after the murders were committed). 
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Rodrigo Hernandez112 Bobby Hines113 Jerry Jackson114 
Robert Jackson115 Derrick Mason116 Milton Wuzael Mathis117 
George Ochoa118 Larry “Matthew”
Puckett119 
Lee Andrew Taylor120 
Table 3: Defendants Between Twenty-one and Twenty-four at the Time 
of the Crime: 
James DeRosa121 Jan Brawner122 Rodney Gray123 
Brett Hartman124 Michael Edward Hooper125 Preston Hughes126 
 109. Twenty years old. Kim Severson, Davis is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/us/final-pleas-and-vigils-in-troy-davis-execution.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
 110. Nineteen years old. Lena Sullivan, Georgia Man Andrew DeYoung Executed for 1993 
Killings, GA Daily News, July 21, 2011, http://www.gadailynews.com/news/70416-georgia-man-
andrew-deyoung-executed-for-1993-killings.html. 
 111. Nineteen years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Yokamon 
Hearn, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/hearnyokamon.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 112. Twenty years old. Appellant’s Brief at 15–16, Hernandez v. Texas, No. AP-74,931 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Mar. 21, 2005). 
113. Nineteen years old. Smith, supra note 78. 
 114. Twenty years old. Jerry Terrell Jackson Executed in Virginia, Huffington Post (Oct. 18, 2011, 
6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/jerry-terrell-jackson-executed_n_930989.html. 
115. Eighteen years old. State of Del. Dep't of Correction, Death Row Executions, 
http://www.doc.delaware.gov/deathrow/executions.shtml (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 116. Nineteen years old. Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ala. at 83, 
Mason v. Campbell, 5:05-1932 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2009) (denying the Amended Habeas Petition and 
Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing). 
 117. Nineteen years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Milton Mathis, 
https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/mathismilton.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 118. Eighteen years old. Ochoa v. State, 963 P.2d 583, 604 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). Clark Cnty. 
Prosecuting Attorney, George Ochoa, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/ 
ochoa1318.htm (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 119. Eighteen years old. Miss. Dep’t of Corrections, Offender Data Sheet—Larry Mathew 
Puckett, 
www.mdoc.state.ms.us/Death%20Row%20Inmates%20PDF%20Files/Puckett,%20Larry%20Mathew
.pdf (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 120. Twenty years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Lee Taylor, 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/taylorlee.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
121. Twenty-three years old. Derosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1200, 1209 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 122. Twenty-three years old. Holbrook Mohr, Jan Brawner Executed For Killing Paige Brawner, 
Barbara Craft, Carl Craft, Jane Craft In Mississippi, Huffington Post (June 12, 2012, 8:16 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/13/jan-brawner-executed-for-_n_1592793.html. 
123. Twenty-two years old. Memorandum Opinion & Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 at *1, *30, Gray v. Epps, No. 4:04-0234 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 2008), 
2008 BL 241359. A state psychologist characterized Gray as childlike and impulsive, and passive-
aggressive with an undeveloped or underdeveloped conscience. See id. at *43–44; see also Colleen 
Jenkins, Mississippi Set to Execute Man for 1994 Murder, Reuters (May 17, 2011, 11:53 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/17/us-execution-mississippi-idUSTRE74G51R20110517. 
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Shannon Johnson127 Eric John King128 Andrew Lackey129 
Humberto Leal130 Samuel Lopez131 Donald Palmer132 
Martin Robles133 Michael Bascum Selsor134 Mario Swain135 
Edwin Turner136 Mark Wiles137 Jason Williams138 
Steven Woods139
Simmons identified three differences between juveniles and adults 
that led the Court to exempt juveniles from the death penalty: a lack of 
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, susceptibility to 
 124. Twenty-three years old. Mitigation Charge, Ohio v. Hartman, No. CR 97 09 1987, 1997 WL 
34650359 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1997). Clark Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney, Brett Xavier Hartman, 
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/hartman1315.htm (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 125. Twenty-one years old. Tim Talley, Michael Hooper Dead: Oklahoma Man Executed For 
Killing Cynthia Lynn Jarman, Her Children, Huffington Post (Aug. 14, 2012, 8:47 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/michael-hooper-dead_n_1777451.html. The court accepted 
youthfulness as a mitigator. Hooper v. State, 947 P.2d 1090, 1116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
 126. Twenty-two years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Preston 
Hughes, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/hughesprestoni.jpg (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 127. Twenty-two years old. Delaware v. Johnson, No. 0609017045, 2008 WL 4140596, at *6 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008). 
128. Twenty-five years old. State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1044–45 (Ariz. 1994). 
 129. Twenty-two years old. Andrew Lackey Execution Raises Questions About the Death Penalty, 
Equal Justice Initiative (July 26, 2013), http://www.eji.org/node/795. The trial court also found that 
Lackey seemed younger than his chronological age and was easily influenced by others, so that he 
often he may not have fully appreciated the reality of what he was doing. Lackey v. State, 104 So. 3d 
234, 253 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).  
130. Twenty-one years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Humberto 
Leal, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/lealhumberto.jpg (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 131. Twenty-four years old. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., Samuel Lopez, http://www.azcorrections.gov/ 
inmate_datasearch/results_Minh.aspx?InmateNumber=043833&LastName=LOPEZ%20SAMUEL,%
20V&FNMI=&SearchType=SearchInet (last visited June 1, 2014).  
 132. Twenty-four years old. State v. Palmer, No. 89-B-28, 1996 WL 495576, at *21 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 29, 1996), aff’d, 80 Ohio St. 3d 543, 1997-Ohio-312, 687 N.E.2d 685. 
 133. Twenty-four years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Martin 
Robles, https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/roblesmartin.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
134. Twenty-one years old. Steve Olafson, Oklahoma Executes Man Sentenced to Death Twice, 
Reuters (May 4, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/02/us-execution-oklahoma-
idUSBRE84100I20120502. Oklahoma Death Row Inmate Faces Execution in 1975 Murder, NewsOK 
(Apr. 29, 2012), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-death-row-inmate-faces-execution-in-1975-murder/ 
article/3671002. 
 135. Twenty-three years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Mario 
Swain, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/swainmario.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 136. Twenty-two years old. Edwin Hart Turner Executed in Mississippi Despite Claims He Was 
Mentally Ill, Huffington Post (Feb. 8, 2012, 9:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/ 
edwin-hart-turner-executed_n_1265535.html. 
 137. Twenty-two years old. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., Ohio Executions—1999 to Present, 
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/Executed/executed25.htm (last visited June 1, 2014). 
138. Twenty-three years old. Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276, 1345 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). 
 139. Twenty-one years old. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Offender Information—Steven 
Woods, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/woodssteven.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
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peer pressure and negative influences, and an unformed character.140 The 
same studies that the Court relied on in Simmons to illuminate the 
differences between juveniles and adults also demonstrate that brain 
development continues past eighteen, particularly in the frontal lobes 
that control judgment, impulse control, the appreciation of 
consequences, empathy, and responsibility.141 The brain also undergoes 
structural changes beyond age eighteen. Indeed, the prefrontal cortex 
does not fully mature until the mid-twenties.142 
The Simmons Court acknowledged the “qualities that distinguish 
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.”143 
The Court chose to nonetheless rely on eighteen as “the point where 
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
adulthood.”144 Despite minimal differences in the functional deficits 
between, for instance, seventeen and twenty, the former offender is 
exempted from capital punishment while the latter is not. More than 
one-third (thirty-six) of executed offenders committed a capital crime 
before turning twenty-five—the age at which the brain fully matures.145 
Twenty offenders had not yet reached the age of twenty-one.146 Four 
offenders were eighteen when the crime was committed—just months 
past the cutoff for an exemption from execution under Simmons.147 
C. Mental Illness 
The National Alliance on Mental Illness (“NAMI”) defines mental 
illnesses as “medical conditions that disrupt a person’s thinking, feeling, 
mood, ability to relate to others and daily functioning.”148 As NAMI 
140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
 141. Id. at 569–70, 573; Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 Developmental Rev. 339, 339, 344 (1992) (“[A]dolescents are overrepresented 
statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior.”). The Court also relied on Lawrence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, 
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009 (2003). See 
generally Eric H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968). 
142. Melissa S. Caulum, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, 
Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 740–46; Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, 
Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from 
Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 207, 236–40 (2003); Craig M. Bennett & Abigail A. Baird, 
Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, 
27 Human Brain Mapping 766, 766–67 (2006); Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory 
of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 Am. Psychologist 469, 471 (2000). 
143. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574. 
144. Id. 
145. See supra Tables 2, 3. 
146. See supra Table 2.  
147. See supra Table 2 (listing Richard Cobb, Robert Jackson, George Ochoa, and Larry 
“Matthew” Puckett). 
 148. Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, Mental Illnesses, http://www.nami.org/ 
template.cfm?section=About_Mental_Illness (last visited June 1, 2014). The only mentally ill 
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highlights, “mental illnesses are medical conditions that often result in a 
diminished capacity for coping with the ordinary demands of life.”149 The 
American Bar Association has determined that severe mental illness 
warrants the exclusion of certain mentally ill offenders from the death 
penalty.150 These illnesses include such clinical disorders as schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorders, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, substance-related disorders (such as substance abuse and 
chemical dependency), suicidal ideation, and dissociative disorders.151 
Consider John Ferguson.152 His father died when he was thirteen,153 
coinciding with the time Ferguson first displayed symptoms of mental 
illness.154 He developed depression and began seeing “shadow people.”155 
Throughout his life, Ferguson experienced delusions that his father was 
still alive and would speak to him.156 Ferguson’s mental health began to 
deteriorate precipitously when he was twenty-one-years-old.157 He 
received a gunshot wound to the head and thereafter presented as 
“paranoid and hostile.”158 He was hospitalized and diagnosed with 
paranoid schizophrenia.159 Ferguson experienced delusional beliefs, 
including that he was the “Prince of God” who would be resurrected to 
sit at the right hand of God.160 He was forcibly committed to a state 
psychiatric facility and discharged just months before he committed the 
crime that resulted in his execution.161 On August 5, 2013, after thirty-
four years on death row, Florida executed Ferguson; his last words 
before he died were: “I just want everyone to know that I am the Prince 
of God and I will rise again.”162 
offenders exempted from capital punishment are those who are insane at the time of execution. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 568. Insanity is a high threshold; it carries a requirement that the offender not 
have a rational understanding of why he is being executed. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 
(2007). 
149. Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, supra note 148. 
 150. Am. Bar Ass’n, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 30 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 668, 668 (2006). 
151. Id. at 670, 672, 674.  
152. Ferguson v. State, 593 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1992). 
153. Id. at 510. 
154. Id.; see Tamara Lush, Convicted Mass Murderer Executed in Florida, USA Today (Aug. 5, 
2013, 7:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/05/convicted-mass-murderer-
executed-in-florida/2621285. 
155. Ferguson v. Secretary, 716 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013). 
156. Id. 
157. Lush, supra note 154. 
158. See Ferguson, 593 So. 2d at 510; see also Lush, supra note 154. 
159. Ferguson, 716 F.3d at 1320. 
160. Id. at 1324. 
161. Id. at 1318–20. 
162. David Ovalle, Miami Killer John Errol Ferguson Executed, Miami Herald (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/08/05/3543609/miami-mass-killer-john-ferguson.html. 
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John Ferguson’s mental illness, though profound, is not 
unrepresentative of the mental illnesses experienced by many executed 
offenders.  
Table 4: Defendants Whose Mitigation Histories Included Symptoms or 
Diagnoses of Mental Illness 
Garry Allen163 Johnnie Baston164 Daniel Lee Bedford165 
Richard Lynn Bible166 William Glenn Boyd167 Jan Brawner168 
Reginald Brooks169 Elmer Leon Carroll170 Richard Aaron Cobb171 
Andrew Allen Cook172 Daniel Wayne Cook173 James DeRosa174 
 163. Allen attempted suicide upwards of five times in his teens. Allen v. State, 923 P.2d 613, 617 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1996), vacated, 520 U.S. 1195 (1997). He began to abuse alcohol and drugs when he 
was seventeen. Id. While serving in the Navy as a young adult, he was hospitalized for psychological 
problems and drug and alcohol abuse. Id. Later, he was diagnosed with a personality disorder related 
to schizophrenia. Id. 
 164. A psychologist deemed it “very likely” that Baston suffered from an undiagnosed bipolar disorder 
which interfered with his functioning. Baston v. Bagley, 282 F. Supp. 2d 655, 664–65 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 
 165. Bedford abused alcohol from the age of fifteen, suffered from depression and suicidal 
ideation, and was diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder. Bedford v. Collins, No. C-1-92-547, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33875, at *30–31, *36 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2007). 
 166. Bible was a chronic drug user who was experiencing a four-day withdrawal at the time of the 
crime. Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 864–66 (9th Cir. 2009). A state expert attributed Bible’s violent 
behavior to his drug addiction, which began in his early teens. Id. at 864–65. 
 167. Based on the trauma he experienced as a child, Boyd presented a high risk of being impulsive 
and “could not make sound decisions based on what he knew.” Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1286–88 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
 168. Brawner was diagnosed with depression and PTSD. Brawner v. Epps, No. 2:07-CV-16, 2010 
WL 383734, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2010). He was admitted to a hospital at fourteen for inhaling 
gasoline and was diagnosed with polysubstance abuse disorder. Id. 
 169. Brooks suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and associated delusions. State of Ohio Adult 
Parole Auth., In re: Reginald Brooks, OSP #79-740, Death Penalty Clemency Report 6 (2011). A 
psychiatrist diagnosed Brooks with PTSD and Psychogenic Amnesia, suggesting he did not understand 
the connection between the crime he committed and his execution. Id. at 8. 
 170. A mental health expert determined that Carroll had “symptomatology that runs the entire 
gamut of several personality disorders, all the way through to a major mental disorder.” Carroll v. 
State, 815 So. 2d 601, 615 (Fla. 2002). 
 171. Cobb began to use drugs at the age of twelve and thereafter developed a lifelong chemical 
dependency. Cobb v. Thaler, No. 2:08-0123, 2011 WL 672333, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2011). 
 172. As a child, Andrew Cook was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for five weeks and several 
psychologists determined that he had tried to kill himself. Cook v. Upton, No. 5:09-0025, 2010 WL 
1050404, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Cook suffered from recurrent major 
depression, dysthymic disorder, and PTSD as a result of his family background. See id. at *12; see also 
Cook v. Warden, 677 F.3d 1133, 1137–39 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 173. Daniel Cook developed PTSD, impaired cognitive functioning, and a drug addiction in 
response to the severe physical and sexual abuse he endured as a child. Cook v. Ryan, No. 97-00146, 
2012 WL 2798789, at *9–10 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012). He attempted suicide on numerous occasions. Id. A 
psychiatrist said that Cook had “various types of alcohol and drug abuse and personality disorder 
problems in addition to the diagnosis of depression or dysthymic disorder.” Id.; see Lewis, supra note 71. 
 174. DeRosa was diagnosed with depression and hyperactivity disorder when he was admitted to a 
psychiatric facility as a teenager. DeRosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1210 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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Andrew Grant DeYoung175 Douglas Alan 
Feldman176 
John Ferguson177 
Cleve Foster178 Robert Gleason179 Rodney Gray180 
Jonathan Green181 Robert Wayne Harris182 Ramon Hernandez183 
Michael Edward Hooper184 Jerry Terrell Jackson185 Robert Jackson186 
Christopher Johnson187 Eric John King188 Andrew Lackey189 
 175. DeYoung was diagnosed with chronic depression and schizotypal personality disorder. 
DeYoung v. Schofield, 609 F.3d 1260, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 176. Feldman was diagnosed with bipolar II disorder one year before the crime and was later 
diagnosed with bipolar I. Feldman v. Thaler, 695 F.3d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 177. Ferguson experienced psychosis, delusions, and schizophrenia. Ferguson v. Secretary, 716 
F.3d 1315, 1320, 1324–26 (11th Cir. 2013). He was hospitalized for treatment. See Ferguson v. State, 
593 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1992); see also Lush, supra note 154; Ovalle, supra note 162. 
 178. Foster served in the U.S. military in Iraq and developed PTSD because of “gruesome 
experiences” he witnessed during his time in the military. Foster v. Thaler, 369 F.App’x 598, 604–05 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
 179. Gleason was found to have “a history of substance abuse, depression, and other problems” 
and he volunteered for execution. See Gleason v. Pearson, No. 7:12-CV-00619, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4226, at *5 (W.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2013); Frank Green, Va. Man Who Killed Two Inmates is Executed, 
Richmond Times Dispatch (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:11 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/latest-
news/convicted-killer-robert-charles-gleason-jr-dies-in-electric-chair/article_533cc100-6029-11e2-9393-
0019bb30f31a.html. 
 180. Gray was committed to a mental health center as a child and a state psychologist testified that 
he had “various emotional problems . . . including suicidal tendencies, depression, sleep and memory 
problems, anxiety” and other mental health issues. Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11, Gray v. Epps, No. 4:04-0234, 2008 WL 4793796 (S.D. Miss. 
Apr. 11, 2005). 
 181. Green was schizophrenic. Jordan Smith, The View From Death Row: Next Week’s Scheduled 
Execution, Austin Chronicle (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2012-10-05/the-view-
from-death-row (noting that “Green has been diagnosed schizophrenic, including by doctors who 
work for the state prison system”). 
 182. Harris suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, PTSD, depression, anti-social personality 
disorder, and Tourette’s syndrome. Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930, 940, 941 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Domingo Ramirez Jr., Brother Pleads for Life of Man Convicted in Carwash Deaths: A Forensic 
Psychologist and a Psychiatrist Detail the Troubled Past of Robert Wayne Harris, Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, Sept. 29, 2000, at 8. 
 183. Hernandez suffered from depression and PTSD brought on by witnessing his father’s murder. 
Manny Gonzales, ‘Your Worst Nightmare’ Is Sentenced to Death, San Antonio Express News, Oct. 
12, 2002, at 3B. Hernandez became addicted to medication prescribed to treat his mental illnesses, and 
was undergoing withdrawal at the time of the crime. Michelle Mondo, Execution Looms for Serial 
Rapist, Murderer, My San Antonio (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/ 
local_news/article/Execution-looms-for-serial-rapist-murderer-4027069.php. 
 184. Hooper had a long history of depression and substance abuse since his teen years. Hooper v. 
Workman, 446 F. App’x 88, 90 (10th Cir. 2011); Hooper v. State, 947 P.2d 1090, 1116 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1997). 
 185. As a child, Jerry Terell Jackson was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder with depressed 
mood and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520, 525 (Va. 
2004). He developed an alcohol dependency at age twelve. Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 486 n.6 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
 186. Robert Jackson suffered from a mixed personality disorder, impulsive control disorder, and 
substance abuse disorder. Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745, 754 (Del. 1996). 
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Samuel Villegas Lopez190 Larry Mann191 Derrick Mason192 
William Gerald Mitchell193 Donald Moeller194 Robert Moormann195 
Jeffrey Motts196 George Ochoa197 Donald Palmer198 
Manuel Pardo199 Eddie Duvall Powell200 Paul Rhoades201 
 187. Johnson was hospitalized on numerous occasions during his adolescence for psychiatric 
problems and began to use alcohol at age twelve and prescription drugs, crack cocaine powder, 
cocaine, crystal methamphetamine and marijuana at age sixteen. Johnson v. State, 40 So. 3d 753, 761–
62 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). 
 188. King had a substance abuse disorder and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a 
result of his dysfunctional childhood. State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1037 (Ariz. 1994). 
 189. Lackey suffered repeated episodes of persistent depression and “had long endured suicidal 
preoccupations.” Lackey v. State, 104 So. 3d 234, 243–44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Texas prison officials 
treated Lackey with psychotropic medications while he was on death row, where he also tried to 
commit suicide. Id. at 245 n.3. However, no further mitigating evidence was presented in his case 
beyond what was presented at trial because Lackey dropped his appeals and was executed. Andrew 
Lackey Execution, supra note 129. 
 190. Lopez suffered acute trauma as a child, which caused hyperarousal, hypervigilance, high 
anxiety, agitation, guardedness, paranoia and night terrors throughout his childhood and into 
adulthood. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 27, Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 12-
99001). He developed depression and a chemical dependency. Id. at 28. By the time he was eighteen, 
Lopez was sniffing paint chronically. Id.  
 191. The trial court judge in Mann’s case found that he suffered from psychotic depression and 
substance abuse. Mann v. State, 603 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 1992). He was later diagnosed as a 
polysubstance abuser. Mann v. State, 770 So. 2d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2000). 
 192.  The judge who sentenced Mason to death later fought to stop his execution, telling the 
Alabama Governor that Mason’s lawyers failed to present evidence that Mason was under the 
influence of hallucinogenic and psychosis-inducing drugs at the time of the crime, and that he had a 
drug addiction and mental health problems. Alabama Executions, Equal Justice Initiative, 
http://www.eji.org/deathpenalty/alabamaexecutions (last visited June 1, 2014). 
 193. Mitchell suffered both auditory and visual hallucinations and had a substance abuse disorder. 
Mitchell v. Epps, No. 1:04-0865, 2010 BL 312883, at *16 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2010). He was diagnosed 
a borderline schizophrenic with symptoms of paranoia and psychosis. Id. at *28; Mitchell v. Epps, 
641 F.3d 134, 147 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 194. Moeller was abusing alcohol consistently by age eight; by age eleven he was smoking marijuana 
and huffing gasoline. Death Penalty: Life of a Child Killer, Argus Leader, Oct. 28, 2012, at A. 
 195. Moormann was diagnosed as schizophrenic with possible psychosis by hospital physicians after 
he was institutionalized at the age of fifteen. Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 9–12, Moormann v. 
Schriro, No. 08-99035 (9th Cir. May 29, 2009), ECF No. 5. Psychologists and psychiatrists concluded that 
he suffered from organic delusional syndrome, pedophilia, schizoid personality disorder and anti-social 
personality disorder. Moormann v. Schiro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 196. Motts had major depressive disorder throughout his life and suffered from a substance abuse 
disorder. State v. Motts, 707 S.E.2d 804, 812 (S.C. 2011). See Jeffrey Collins, Inmate Jeffrey Motts First 
to Die in SC with New Combo of Drugs, Associated Press, May 6, 2011. 
 197. Ochoa had a history of mental health problems and drug and alcohol dependencies. Ochoa v. 
State, 963 P.2d 583, 603–04 (Okla. Crimm. App. 1998). 
 198. Palmer suffered from a borderline personality disorder. State v. Palmer, No. 89-B-28, 1996 
WL 495576, at *20 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1996). 
 199. The trial court found that Pardo was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time of the crime. Pardo v. State, 563 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1990). 
 200. Powell suffered from childhood depression and began drinking and taking drugs at a young 
age. Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 201. A “working assessment” of Rhoades by a mental health expert listed diagnoses of PTSD, 
cognitive disorder, substance-induced mood disorder, and substance-induced psychotic disorder.  
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Donnie Lee Roberts202 Steven Smith203 Benny Joe Stevens204 
Richard Stokley205 Mark Anthony
Stroman206 
Frederick Treesh207 
Steven Ray Thacker208 Edwin “Hart” Turner209 Robert Waterhouse210 
Gary Welch211 Thomas Paul West212 Mark Wayne Wiles213 
Jason Oric Williams214 Steven Michael 
Woods215 
Rhoades was addicted to methamphetamine. Rhoades v. Arave, No. 93-0156, 2007 WL 951897, at *38 
(D. Idaho Mar. 28, 2007).  
 202. Roberts was diagnosed with alcohol dependence and cocaine dependence. Roberts v. State, 
220 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 203. Testing revealed that Smith had depression, dysthymic disorder, and a substance abuse 
disorder. State v. Smith, 780 N.E.2d 221, 237 (Ohio 2002). 
 204. Stevens was suffering from depression and substance abuse. Stevens v. State, 867 So. 2d. 219, 
223 (Miss. 2003).  
 205. Stokley had a history of depression and substance abuse, and a diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder. State v. Stokley, 898 P.2d 454, 469–71 (Ariz. 1995). 
 206. Stroman had an “untreated behavioral disorder” and a drug addiction. Stroman v. Thaler, 
No. 3:05-1616, 2009 WL 3075168, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2009). 
 207. Treesh was diagnosed with attention deficit/hyperactivity syndrome and a substance abuse 
disorder. Treesh v. Bagley, No. 1:02 CV 462, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28985, at *130, *159–60 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 31, 2007). 
 208. Thacker was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Thacker v. Workman, No. 06-0028, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 92322, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2010). 
 209. Turner began exhibiting symptoms of mental illness during early adolescence. Turner v. Epps, 
No. 4:07-0077, 2010 WL 653880, at *12 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010). His mother took him to the hospital 
twice for his “abnormal behavior” and after the second visit, Turner tried to commit suicide by 
shooting himself in the head with a rifle. Id. For the following four years he was in and out of hospital 
until his second suicide attempt, when he tried to slit his wrists. Id. He was diagnosed with major 
depressive disorder and borderline personality disorder. Id.  
 210. Waterhouse did not permit his lawyers to present mitigation evidence during the penalty 
phase of his trial. Nonetheless, the trial record contains (and the state habeas court recounted) a 
statement from Waterhouse to the police suggesting his intoxication on the night of the crime. 
Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d 84, 95 (Fla. 2012) (“Waterhouse advised the police that on the night of 
the murder he consumed eight or nine beers before arriving at the ABC lounge and four or five white 
Russians while at the lounge.”). Waterhouse acknowledged in a later jailhouse interview with an 
investigative reporter that he had abused alcohol beginning at age fifteen and eventually drank as 
many as three six-packs of beer a day. See Troy Gustavson, From the Archives: What Went Wrong with 
Robert Waterhouse?, Riverhead News-Review (Feb. 15, 2012, 7:00 AM), 
http://riverheadnewsreview.timesreview.com/2012/02/34260/from-the-archives-what-went-wrong-with-
robert-waterhouse. 
 211. Welch became chemically dependent on drugs at the age of thirteen. Witnesses at trial 
testified that his violent behavior was the result of drug abuse and a brain injury that caused blackouts. 
Brief of Appellant at 34, Welch v. Workman, 607 F.3d 674 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 07-5061). 
212. West became addicted to drugs at the age of ten. State v. West, 862 P.2d. 192, 210 (Ariz. 1993). 
 213. Wiles had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and suffered from depression and anxiety. 
State v. Wiles, No. 1675, 1988 WL 59838, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 3, 1998).  
214. Williams was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and substance abuse, and 
attempted suicide. Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d 778, 785–86 (11th Cir. 2010). A state psychologist 
testified that Williams probably wouldn’t have killed the victim if his intoxication hadn’t exacerbated 
his borderline personality disorder. Id. at 786. 
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Over half (fifty-four) of the last one hundred executed offenders 
had been diagnosed with or displayed symptoms of a severe mental 
illness.216 Six defendants were diagnosed with schizophrenia,217 three with 
bipolar disorder,218 and nine with post-traumatic stress disorder.219 Six 
defendants attempted suicide during their lifetimes.220 These mental 
illnesses impair the ability to think clearly, manage emotions, make 
decisions, relate to others, and cause unpredictable and disorganized 
behavior.221 
The most prevalent mental illness among defendants in our sample 
was chronic drug addiction. Thirty-four executed offenders had histories 
of addiction, which began as early as age eight.222 Consider Richard Lynn 
Bible, a chronic drug user who was experiencing a four-day withdrawal at 
the time that he committed murder.223 A state expert attributed Bible’s 
violent behavior to his drug addiction, which began in his early teens.224 
Consider also Derrick Mason.225 The judge who sentenced Mason to 
death later fought to stop his execution, telling the Alabama Governor 
that Mason’s lawyers failed to present evidence that Mason was under 
the influence of hallucinogenic and psychosis-inducing drugs at the time 
of the crime and also had drug addiction and mental health problems.226 
People tend to associate drug addiction with a lack of character or 
willpower.227 However, as David Sheff has underscored, “[m]ost 
problematic drug use is related to stress, trauma, genetic predisposition, 
mild or serious mental illness, use at an early age, or some combination of 
 215. Woods was institutionalized four times as a teenager for mental health and drug-related 
problems, and engaged in self-injurious behavior like cutting. Woods v. Thaler, 339 F. App’x 884, 886–
87 (5th Cir. 2010). He was also addicted to drugs. Woods v. Quarterman, No. 6:06cv344, 2009 WL 
2757181, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2009). 
216. See infra Table 1.  
 217. Gary Allen, Reginald Brooks, John Ferguson, Jonathan Green, William Gerald Mitchell, and 
Robert Moorman. See supra Table 4. 
218. Johnnie Baston, Douglas Alan Feldman, and Steven Ray Thacker. See supra Table 4. 
219. Jan Michael Brawner, Reginald Brooks, Andrew Cook, Daniel Wayne Cook, Cleve Foster, 
Robert Wayne Harris, Ramon Hernandez, Eric John King, and Paul Rhoades. See supra Table 4. 
 220. Gary Allen, Andrew Cook, Daniel Wayne Cook, Andrew Lackey, Edwin “Hart” Turner, and 
Jason Oric Williams. See supra Table 4.  
 221. Our results dovetail with calls from other scholars to extend categorical exemptions to 
mentally ill offenders. Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued that “if . . . the most important 
factors in determining which murderers may be put to death are relative culpability and deterrability, 
there may even not be any plausible reasons for differentiating between execution of people with 
mental illness and execution of people with mental retardation or juveniles.” Christopher Slobogin, 
What Atkins Could Mean for People With Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 293, 293 (2003). 
 222. Donald Moeller began abusing alcohol when he was eight years old. Death Penalty, supra 
note 194, at A. 
223. Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 864–66. (9th Cir. 2009). 
224. Id. at 866. 
225. Alabama Executions, supra note 192. 
226. Id. 
227. David Sheff, Clean: Overcoming Addiction and Ending America’s Greatest Tragedy x (2013). 
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those.”228 Addiction is a grave illness—those who suffer from it are 
“afflicted with a chronic, progressive, and often terminal disease.”229 
Addiction is associated with different physiological responses in different 
people, including genetic differences in how long the “drug will remain 
active in a users’ bloodstream, how many dopamine receptors will be 
displayed on the surface of a neuron, the proper balance of mood-
controlling chemicals in the brain, and [how] they also influence basic 
temperament and personality traits, such as stress sensitivity, impulsivity, 
and risk taking.”230 Thus, like juvenile status or intellectual disability, 
addiction reduces the moral blameworthiness of the offense. 
In Simmons, the Court explained that in addition to their diminished 
culpability, juveniles also are difficult to classify as death-worthy because 
the “reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is 
less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”231 Judgments of 
irreparable depravity are equally irresponsible when rendered upon an 
addicted offender. Just as a seventeen-year-old offender can develop into 
a responsible adult, with proper treatment a drug-addicted offender can 
also be redeemed. “Addicts,” writes David Sheff, “can lead full lives free 
from the pain that plagued them and the disease that controlled them.”232 
In this sense, then, states often execute addicted offenders who are in 
many respects not the same person that a jury sentenced to death years—
or decades—earlier. 
D. Childhood Trauma 
As a child, Daniel Cook consistently endured physical and sexual 
abuse at the hands of his immediate family, including his mother, father, 
and grandparents.233 His manic-depressive mother abused drugs and 
alcohol during her pregnancy with Cook.234 As a young boy, Cook 
suffered rapes and molestations by his mother and grandparents.235 He was 
also physically abused and beaten.236 On one occasion, his father burned 
Cook’s penis with a lit cigarette.237 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 40. 
231. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).  
232. Sheff, supra note 227, at xxii. 
233. See Cook v. Ryan, No. 97-0146, 2012 WL 2798789, at *9 (N.D. Ariz. July 9, 2012); see also 
Lewis, supra note 71. 
234. Lewis, supra note 71. 
235. Id. 
236. Cook, 2012 WL 2798789, at *9. 
237. Lewis, supra note 71. 
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Cook lived in various foster and group homes during his childhood.238 
The house parent in one of these homes used Cook and other boys in the 
home in sadistic rituals to provide sexual entertainment for adults.239 
Records show that Cook would be chained to a bed naked in a room with 
a one-way mirror, and adults would watch from the other side as the foster 
parent raped him.240 At the age of fifteen, the same house leader forcibly 
circumcised Cook.241 That same year, he was gang raped by other boys in 
the home.242 On another occasion, he was sexually molested at a bus 
station.243 Cook developed a substance-abuse disorder at a young age, 
drinking alcohol at fourteen and taking barbiturates and hallucinogens at 
sixteen and seventeen.244 As a teenager, Cook was repeatedly hospitalized 
for depression and suicidal tendencies after trying to kill himself.245 At his 
clemency hearing, the prosecutor who had Cook convicted and sentenced 
to death supported his clemency petition, declaring that he would not have 
sought the death penalty against Cook if he had known of his traumatic 
upbringing.246 
Fifty percent (fifty) of the last hundred executed defendants around 
the country suffered from complex trauma like Daniel Cook—severe 
physical abuse, sexual molestations, domestic violence, the violent loss of 
immediate family and chronic homelessness.247  
Table 5: Defendants Whose Mitigation Histories Included Evidence of 
Childhood Trauma: 
Gary Allen248 Johnnie Baston249 Daniel Lee Bedford250 
238. Cook, 2012 WL 2798789, at *10. 
239. Lewis, supra note 71. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Cook, 2012 WL 2798789, at *9. 
243. Id. at *10. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at *11. 
247. See supra Table 5.  
248. Allen was raised in poverty in an unstable family with an alcoholic mother who rejected him. 
Allen v. State, 923 P.2d 613, 617 (Okla. 1996), vacated, Allen v. Oklahoma, 520 U.S. 1195 (1997). 
 249. Baston was abandoned by his mentally ill mother and raised by his abusive and neglectful father 
until he was two years old, at which time he went to live with his aunt. State of Ohio Adult Parole 
Auth., In re: Johnnie R. Baston, OSP #A308-174: Death Penalty Clemency Report 10 (2011). 
Baston’s behavior spiraled out of control after a failed attempt to reconnect with his father, who told 
Baston he couldn’t live with him because he would “contaminate” his other children. Id. at 11.  
 250. Bedford’s father was an alcoholic and a drug user who abandoned Bedford when he was nine 
years old. Bedford v. Collins, No. C-1-92-547, 2007 WL 3046443, at *29 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2007). 
Bedford’s mother also abandoned her children and died of brain cancer shortly after reuniting with 
them. Id. at *26. Bedford’s father was later murdered by a girlfriend. Id. at *27.  
1248 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1221 
Roy Willard 
Blankenship251 
William Boyd252 Jan Michael Brawner253 
Elmer Leon Carroll254 Richard Cobb255 Andrew Allen Cook256 
Daniel Wayne Cook257 James DeRosa258 Guadalupe Esparza259 
 251. Blankenship’s family had a history of mental illness: his father was an alcoholic, his uncle was 
institutionalized for the better part of his life, and his twin sisters suffered from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia. Blankenship v. Terry, No. 405-0194, 2007 WL 4404972, at *10–12 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 
2007). Blankenship’s father was extremely abusive—he would beat Blankenship’s mother on a regular 
basis, including when she was pregnant with Blankenship. Id. at *10. On one occasion while he was 
still in the womb, Blankenship’s father choked his mother within inches of her life. Id. Blankenship 
was also raised in poverty. Id. at *9. As a newborn he slept in a dresser drawer because his parents 
could not afford a crib. Id. at *10. When Blankenship was only days old, his father came home drunk 
and slammed the dresser draw shut with Blankenship inside so that the whole dresser fell backward 
and he was nearly killed. Id. His mother had a nervous breakdown and was hospitalized after his 
father and his aunt died of carbon monoxide poisoning in a hotel room. Id. When Blankenship was 
eight or nine years old, an older neighbor sodomized him. Id. at *11. Someone who witnessed the 
assault told Blankenship’s mother, who proceeded to “whip the daylights out of him.” Id. 
Blankenship’s mother remarried three times—one of her husbands beat Blankenship and brutalized 
and killed his pets in front of him. Id. During his childhood, the family moved between ten and fifteen 
times. Id. at *12. Eventually, his mother abandoned her children, and Blankenship dropped out of high 
school to join the military. Id.  
 252. Boyd’s father was a violent alcoholic who was incarcerated numerous times during Boyd’s 
childhood. Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2010). Boyd’s mother remarried when he 
was eight years old. Id. at 1287. Boyd’s stepfather brutally beat him and his siblings, locking his 
mentally disabled sister in her room for days and weeks. Id. She was ultimately removed from the 
home by social services. Id. Boyd’s mother and sister both attempted suicide during his childhood. Id. 
He lived in poverty, eating dirt for nutrients when there wasn’t enough food in the home. Id. 
 253. Brawner’s father repeatedly raped Brawner’s younger sister in front of him and then beat him 
afterward to keep him silent. Brawner v. Epps, No. CIV.A207CV16MPM, 2010 WL 383734, at *6 
(N.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2010). Brawner’s family engaged in drug and alcohol abuse, and as a result they 
had financial struggles that caused them to move numerous times during Brawner’s childhood. Id. 
 254. A mental health expert found evidence that Carroll was subjected to physical and sexual 
abuse. Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 615 (Fla. 2002). 
 255. Cobb and two of his brothers were placed in foster care because their mother was an alcoholic 
and drug addict who abused and neglected her children. Cobb v. Thaler, No. 2:08-0123, 2011 WL 
672333, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2011). 
 256. Cook suffered verbal, physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his stepfather, sister and possibly 
another relative. Cook v. Upton, No. 5:09-0025, 2010 WL 1050404, at *12 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2010). 
 257. Cook suffered extreme sexual and physical abuse at the hands of his mother, father and 
grandparents, and was placed in a group home where he was raped and tortured. See Cook v. Ryan, No. 97-
0146, 2012 WL 2798789, at *9 (N.D. Ariz. July 9, 2012); see also Lewis, supra note 71. 
 258. Derosa was abandoned by his father at the time of his birth, and his mother enrolled in the 
military and abandoned him soon thereafter. Derosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1209 (10th Cir. 
2012). He was returned to his father’s care as a toddler after being left in a daycare center for two 
weeks. Id. at 1215–16. His father was a heavy drinker and violent. Id. at 1216. He sexually abused 
Derosa’s sister and possibly Derosa. Id. at 1211, 1217. Derosa’s father and stepmother whipped him 
for wetting the bed, threw plates at him, and otherwise physically abused him. Id. at 1211. Eventually, 
he was returned to his mother’s care, who moved him to Germany with her new husband. Id. at 1210. 
His mother suffered from alcoholism, paranoia, aggression and other symptoms of mental illness. Id. 
at 1216. While in Germany, Derosa had to be returned to the U.S. to receive inpatient psychiatric 
treatment. Id. at 1218. In all, DeRosa was abandoned by significant attachment figures more than 
seven times during his childhood. Id. at 1212. 
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John Ferguson260 Cleve Foster261 Robert Alton Harris262 
Brett Hartman263 Ramon Hernandez264 Rodrigo Hernandez265 
Bobby Hines266 Michael Edward 
Hooper267 
Preston Hughes268 
Jerry Terrell Jackson269 Robert Jackson270 Christopher Johnson271 
 259. Esparza was placed in an orphanage at the age of six and remained there for several years 
while his mother was hospitalized for mental illness. See Crime & Courts: [Metro Edition], San 
Antonio Express-News, Mar. 15, 2001, at 2B. 
 260. Ferguson grew up in poverty. Ferguson v. State, 593 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1992). His father was 
an alcoholic who died when he was thirteen, which triggered major depression and delusions in 
Ferguson. Id. He witnessed his mother being physically abused by subsequent boyfriends. Id. 
 261. Foster was physically abused as a child. Foster v. Thaler, 369 F. App’x 598, 605 (5th Cir. 2010). 
He was hit with belts and tree branches. Id. His father was an alcoholic who sexually abused his 
brother on multiple occasions, which Foster witnessed. Id. He later learned that his father also sexually 
abused his sisters. Id. Foster was traumatized when he discovered the decomposing body parts of his 
murdered brother. Id. 
 262. Harris suffered extreme abuse as a child at the hands of his father. Harris v. Vasquez, 
943 F.2d 930, 939 (9th Cir. 1990). When Harris was two years old, his father hit him so that he fell out 
of his high chair, began to convulse and bleed profusely from his nose, mouth, and ears. Id. Harris’s 
father then tried to choke him with a table cloth. Id. His sister testified that Harris’s father beat Harris 
and his other children into unconsciousness several times. Id. Eventually, Harris’s father was sent to 
prison for child abuse and molestation. Id. 
 263. Hartman’s stepfather was physically abusive to him and his mother sent him away to live with 
an aunt, fearing for his safety. Report or Affidavit of James W. Siddal, Ph.D., State v. Hartmann, 
No. CR97091987 (Ohio C.P. May 13, 1998), 1998 WL 35249306. During his teenage years, he 
developed a drug and alcohol problem and was placed in a youth home. Id.  
 264. When Hernandez was a teenager, his father was shot and died in his arms. Hernandez v. 
Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 504, 558 n.143 (W.D. Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 463 F. App’x 349 (5th Cir. 2012). 
The trauma of this event onset depression, anxiety and PTSD in Hernandez. See id.; see also Gonzales, 
supra note 183. 
 265. Hernandez never met his father, and his mother was a drug addict who was incarcerated 
intermittently during his childhood. Appellant’s Brief at 18, Hernandez v. Texas, No. AP-74,931, 2006 
WL 367271 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2006). He was raised by poor relatives who were on public 
welfare. Id. at 18. 
 266. Hines had a “nightmarish” childhood due to chronic abuse at the hands of his alcoholic father 
and, later, foster parents. Smith, supra note 78. He was abandoned as a young child by his mother. Id. 
 267. Hooper had “a stormy and troubled childhood” in which he was frequently separated from his 
mother. Hooper v. State, 947 P.2d 1090, 1116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Hooper was kidnapped when 
he was an infant. Id. 
 268. Hughes and his sister were sexually abused as children by their uncle. Allan Turner, Killer's 
Lawyer Says Police Lied About Teen's Dying Accusation, Houston Chron. (Nov. 13, 2013, 10:04 PM), 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Killer-s-lawyer-says-police-lied-about-teen-
s-4031052.php. 
 269. Jackson endured physical and sexual abuse as a child. Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 486 n.6 
(4th Cir. 2011). Reports suggest that Jackson was molested for years during his childhood, including 
when he raped at the age of seven by a visitor to his grandmother’s house. Id. On other occasions he 
witnessed his brother being raped by an uncle while he hid in the closet. Id. 
 270. At trial, the court accepted Jackson’s abusive family life as a mitigating factor. Jackson v. 
State, 684 A.2d 745, 754 (Del. 1996). 
 271. Johnson reported that he was sexually molested by an uncle from the ages of seven through 
twelve. Johnson v. State, 40 So.3d 753, 761 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). He was first hospitalized for 
behavior and conduct issues when he was twelve years old. Id. at 762. 
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Shannon Johnson272 Cary Kerr273 Eric John King274 
Rickey Lynn Lewis275 Samuel Villegas 
Lopez276 
Derrick Mason277 
Donald Moeller278 Robert Moorman279 Jeffrey Motts280 
John Quintanilla, Jr.281 Paul Rhoades282 Gary Carl Simmons283 
 272. Johnson suffered neglect and a “chaotic and self-directed lifestyle” from an early age. State v. 
Johnson, No. 0609017045, 2008 WL 4140596, at *5–6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sep. 5, 2008). 
 273. Kerr’s youth was “riddled with poverty” and he and his siblings often went without food. 
Brandi Grissom, Execution Challenge is First for Texas Appeals Office, Texas Trib. (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2011/05/03/execution-challenge-first-for-texas-appeals-office. His parents 
were both alcoholics, and his mother abandoned him when he was young. Id. Kerr was sexually 
assaulted at age five and again at age twelve. Id. He experienced homelessness from a young age. Id. 
 274. King had a traumatic childhood and a dysfunctional family which caused him to suffer from 
mental illness as an adult. State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1037 (Ariz. 1994). 
 275. Lewis’s father abused him and he was forced to shoot his father in order to protect his mother 
when he was ten years old. Texas Executes Man for 1990 Fatal Shooting, Rape, CBS Local DFW (Apr. 
9, 2013), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/04/09/texas-executes-man-for-1990-fatal-shooting-rape. 
 276. Lopez suffered “chronic and horrific violence,” witnessed physical and sexual assaults against 
his mother, and was repeatedly abandoned and neglected by his attachment figures. Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant at 238, Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 12-99001). His family 
was “extraordinarily poor” and his alcoholic father was “cruel and vicious.” Id.  
 277. The judge who sentenced Mason to death later fought against his execution because Mason’s 
lawyers failed to present evidence that Mason was a victim of physical and sexual abuse. Petition for 
Writ of Cert. at 31–32, Ex Parte Mason, No. 1971489 (Ala. 2011); Alabama Executions, supra note 192. 
 278. Moeller’s father left his mother before Moeller was born. Death Penalty, supra note 194. He 
experienced “pervasive and open rejection” from his mother, who would leave him with a neighbor 
while she travelled with her boyfriend. Id. Moeller’s mother and her boyfriend would tether Moeller 
to a bus with a rope while they went partying. Id. His mother beat him and once slammed his head 
with a hot frying pan. Id. At other times, she would bring men home from the bar and perform sexual 
acts with them in front of her children. Id. Moeller was abusing alcohol by the time he was eight years 
old, and drugs by the time he was eleven. Id.  
 279. Moorman was sexually abused by his adoptive mother since he was a child. Opening Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Moormann v. Schriro, No. 08-99035 (9th Cir. May 29, 2009), ECF No. 5. A parole 
officer who worked with Moorman when he was a teenager said his mother’s abuse was exploitative and had 
gone on for many years. Id. at 13. Moorman was institutionalized throughout his childhood in a facility that 
was known for “brutal beatings, sexual misconduct and verbal humiliation.” Id. at 10.  
 280. At trial, Motts’ attorneys put on evidence that Motts grew up witnessing abuse at the hands of 
his alcoholic father. Collins, supra note 196. 
 281. Quintanilla was raised in a fatherless home and developed a drug addiction and became suicidal in 
his teenage years. Quintanilla v. Thaler, No. 09-0039, 2011 WL 284353, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2011). 
 282. Rhoades’s family was plagued by mental health and substance abuse disorders. Rhoades v. 
Henry, 596 F.3d 1170, 1191 (9th Cir. 2010). Rhoades’ father beat his children, and his father and 
mother’s relationship was emotionally and physically abusive. Id. The family was also fraught with 
unhealthy sexual behaviors. Id. Rhoades’s sister was sexually abused by cousins and an uncle, and 
Rhoades and another sister had a sexual relationship, as did Rhoades with his aunt after her husband 
committed suicide. Id. Multiple members of Rhoades’s family were institutionalized, determined to 
have sub-average intelligence, or committed suicide. Id. 
 283. Simmons and his brothers were beaten by Simmons’s stepfather on a daily basis. Simmons v. 
State, 869 So. 2d 995, 1001 (Miss. 2004). He received the worst of the violence because he was the 
eldest son. Id. His stepfather also beat Simmons’s mother and once shot at Simmons when he tried to 
defend her. Id. 
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Steven Smith284 Mark Anthony 
Stroman285 
Mario Swain286 




Robert Charles Towery290 Edwin Hart Turner291 Manuel Valle292 
Robert Waterhouse293 Thomas Paul West294 Steven Michael Woods295 
 284. Smith’s biological father had no contact with him while he was growing up, and his mother’s 
husband was a violent alcoholic. State v. Smith, 780 N.E.2d 221, 236 (Ohio 2002). Smith’s stepfather 
drank and used drugs, whipped Smith with a belt, and threatened the family that he would burn their 
house down. Id. 
 285. Stroman had a “troubled” and “deprived” youth. Stroman v. Thaler, No. 3:05- 1616, 2009 WL 
3075168, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2009). He ran away from an abusive home upward of eleven 
times, and endured an abusive and neglectful environment under his parents’ care. Id. 
 286. Swain was raised in an abusive household where his alcoholic and drug-addicted father would 
beat his mother. Brief for Petitioner at 46–47, Swain v. Thaler, No. 10-70011 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 2010), 
2010 WL 5558278. Swain was locked in a closet while this took place. Id. On one occasion, Swain’s 
father threatened his mother by dangling Swain over an upstairs banister by his foot. Id.  
 287. Thacker’s mother testified that she drank when he was a child and that his sister, who was two 
years older than him, was his primary caretaker. Thacker v. Workman, No. 06-0028, 2010 WL 3466707, 
at *30 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2010). She also testified that one of her boyfriends was “mean” to her 
children. Id.  
 288. Threadgill suffered from childhood hunger and neglect, a disruptive childhood occasioned by 
fifteen to sixteen moves from the time of Threadgill’s birth to his eighteenth birthday, a highly 
dangerous neighborhood environment, and the coming and going of at least eleven men in the family 
home, some of whom were violent. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Threadgill v. Thaler, No. 13-1138 
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2013). 
 289. Thurmond experienced child abuse at the hands of his father, who was an abusive alcoholic. 
Brief for Appellant at 24, Thurmond v. Thaler, No. 08-70008 (5th Cir. Oct. 7, 2009). He witnessed his 
father beating his mother and his brother. Id. Thurmond’s father also used psychological abuse against 
his family, preventing his wife and children from communicating with their extended family. See 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Thurmond v. Dretke, No. H-05-384 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006). 
This abuse was reported to have a dramatic effect on all the children in the family, engendering violent 
tendencies and drug abuse disorders in each of them, including Thurmond. See id. at 7–8. 
 290. Towery was physically and mentally abused by his mother. Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 936 
(9th Cir. 2012). His sisters testified that this abuse included forcing Towery to kneel in a box of rice 
when he complained that his leg hurt after falling from a wagon, and gagging him with a sock and 
binding his hands in the back of the car while on a family trip. Id. at 938. 
 291. Turner endured severe abuse and neglect during his childhood. Petitioner Edwin Hart 
Turner’s Memorandum in Support of Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus at 33, Turner 
v. Epps, No. 4:07-0077 (N.D. Miss. 2007). Turner’s parents were alcoholics who were involved in
violent domestic disputes. Id. at 2 n.1. His father died in an explosion when Turner was twelve years 
old (possibly suicide), and Turner’s mother remarried the following year. Id. at 38–40. She cut off 
contact with her extended family, and her new husband abused Turner and his brother. Id. at 40, 42. 
After he tried to kill himself by shooting himself in the face with a rifle, his mother and stepfather 
threw him out of the house and he was forced to live in a tent. Id. at 45, 51.  
 292. Valle had a “traumatic relationship” with his family. Valle v. Crosby, No. 03-20387, 2005 WL 
3273754, at *72 n.23 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13 2005). His parents were “very strict” and detached, engaging in 
harsh discipline. Id. at *72 n.26.  
 293. Waterhouse said he was the victim of homosexual rape when he was nine years old, but at the 
time of trial he would not allow his defense attorney to put on any mitigating evidence. Gustavson, 
supra note 210. 
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Children who have been exposed to one or more such traumas over 
the course of their lives may develop physiological reactions that persist 
and affect the development of their brains and bodies, including post-
traumatic stress disorder.296 Traumatic stress can negatively impact school 
performance, change the way children view the world and their futures, 
and cause psychological and physiological problems that persist into 
adulthood.297 
Based on data collected for the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health, Janet Currie and Erdal Tekin found that childhood 
maltreatment nearly doubles the likelihood that a person engages in a 
variety of different crimes, including hard and soft drug crimes, assault, 
and armed robbery.298 This finding holds even among twins when one 
sibling suffered maltreatment and the other did not.299 The study found 
that impoverished children are both more likely to be maltreated and 
more likely to commit a crime after being maltreated than other 
children.300 The study also found that increased severity of abuse is related 
to increased criminality.301 Sexual abuse is the single type of maltreatment 
most associated with increased criminality.302 In addition to the severity 
of the offense, multiple types of abuse in one child (such as physical and 
sexual) also are associated with increased criminality.303 These findings 
 294. West’s father was an alcoholic and West witnessed physical violence in the home from an 
early age. West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2010). He had an unstable and abusive home 
environment and a “deprived childhood.” State v. West, 862 P.2d. 192, 211 (Ariz. 1993). 
 295. Woods had an alcoholic and physically abusive father. Ex Parte Woods, 176 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2005). He suffered neglect and was hospitalized four times between the ages of thirteen and 
eighteen for mental and drug-related problems. Id.; Woods v. Thaler, 339 F. App’x 884, 886 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 296. Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Does Child Abuse Cause Crimes? at 4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12171, 2006). 
 297. Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty 
Cases, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 677, 689 (2008) (listing aspects of the defendant’s character and history that 
defense counsel must investigate as a basis for a sentence less than death in Guideline 10.11(B)). 
Other examples include chronic poverty, homelessness, exposure to violence, substance-abuse or self-
harm, and abandonment. See id.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000) (finding trial 
counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present at trial Taylor’s history of criminal neglect and 
abuse at the hands of his parents and foster carers); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003) (finding 
that defense counsel ought to have discovered and presented evidence of severe privation and abuse at 
the hands of an alcoholic and absentee mother; physical torment, sexual molestation and repeated 
rapes in foster care; and finally, homelessness). 
 298. See Currie & Tekin, supra note 296, at 27–28. Another study found that child abuse increases 
risk of committing a violent crime by thirty percent. Nat’l Inst. Of Justice, Impact of Child Abuse 
and Maltreatment on Delinquency, Arrest and Victimization (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nij.gov/ 
topics/crime/child-abuse/pages/impact-on-arrest-victimization.aspx. 
299. See Currie & Tekin, supra note 296, at 24–25. 
300. Id. at 9.  
301. Id. at 31. 
302. Id. at 25. 
303. Id. at 27. 
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support a cumulative trauma—or compounded stress—theory, which is 
based on the idea that resiliency decreases and functional deficits 
increase in response to multiple or chronic stressors.304 Finally, the link 
between maltreatment and future criminal conduct also appears to have 
gender and socioeconomic dimensions. First, increased probability of 
crime commission is steeper among maltreated boys.305 Second, 
maltreatment and poverty, when combined, are associated with functional 
deficits that exceed either maltreatment or poverty separately.306 These 
gender and socioeconomic dimensions are relevant here because most 
executed offenders are male and many of those offenders who suffered 
childhood trauma also faced poverty. 
Nearly nine of every ten executed offenders possessed an intellectual 
impairment, had not yet reached their twenty-first birthday, suffered from 
a severe mental illness, or endured marked childhood trauma. Each of 
these mitigation areas involves functional deficits that rival—and in some 
respects outpace—those associated with intellectual disability and 
juvenile status. Over half of these offenders fell into multiple mitigation 
categories, which further increases the risk of wrongful executions as the 
culpability of these offenders is diminished across multiple non-
overlapping dimensions.307 
The next Part grapples with the reality that these mitigation 
histories suggest: existing mitigation-facilitating procedures fail to ensure 
that only offenders with extreme culpability are executed.308 
III. Do Existing Procedures Ensure that Only Murderers with
Extreme Culpability Are Executed? 
Drawing upon our examination of the mitigation histories of the last 
hundred offenders, this Part offers a few preliminary thoughts on why 
both individualized sentencing and categorical exemption might fail in 
practice to enforce the extreme culpability requirement. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 3. 
306. Id. 
307. Note that our findings almost certainly underestimate the number of people who fall into one 
or more of these categories, as the appellate records in many cases—especially in those of the thirteen 
offenders without discernable mitigation—suggest markedly incomplete mitigation investigations. 
 308. Our study does not adjust for aggravating circumstances. A number of studies demonstrate 
that arbitrariness still exists in the sorting of capital defendants based on the amount of aggravation 
present in a case. See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with 
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1227, 1261 (2013). 
For our purposes, however, we assume substantial aggravation is present in every case, as there was in 
both Atkins and Simmons. Our proposition, which is the same as the one relied upon in Atkins and 
Simmons, is that the presence of substantial intellectual and psychological deficits can render the 
defendant insufficiently culpable regardless of the aggravating circumstances available in the case. 
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A. The Inadequacy of Individualized Sentencing? 
We located extensive and pervasive mitigating characteristics for the 
vast majority of executed offenders. In the face of these mitigating factors, 
is it nonetheless possible that individualized sentencing does adequately 
enforce the extreme culpability? Some might argue that the juries that 
decided the fate of these executed offenders performed informed 
selectivity; that is, they adequately accounted for the mitigation evidence 
but nonetheless found the offenders to possess the requisite extreme 
culpability. Justice O’Connor articulated this view in her Simmons dissent: 
“Whatever can be said about the comparative moral culpability of 17-year-
olds as a general matter, Simmons’ actions unquestionably reflect a 
consciousness materially more depraved than that of the average 
murderer.”309 
There are, however, several reasons to reject the informed selectivity 
explanation. First, the sheer percentage of executed offenders that fall into 
one (eighty-seven percent) or multiple (fifty-five percent) mitigation 
categories belies the suggestion that executed offenders possess the 
extreme culpability contemplated by the Court. The fact that almost one 
in ten executed offenders had an IQ score in the intellectually disabled 
range further diminishes the informed selectivity argument. The 
informed selectivity explanation becomes less likely still after considering 
that a significant number of executed offenders did not present (or 
adequately present) the mitigation evidence found in their post-
conviction claims at the trial level.310 Indeed, a better hypothesis is that 
many executed offenders received insufficient lawyering, which obscured 
the culpability determination by preventing full jury consideration of the 
mitigation evidence. Finally, there is the so-called “double edged sword” 
problem, which is the concern that inherently mitigating circumstances 
(e.g., mental illness or youthfulness) are treated as aggravating factors 
due to their association with increased dangerousness of the offender.311 
This mistreatment of important mitigation evidence is not certain to 
occur, but it nonetheless does contribute to an “unacceptable likelihood” 
that “the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would 
overpower mitigating arguments . . . even where [those factors] should 
require a sentence less severe than death.”312 When viewed as a whole, 
then, there is little reason to champion the informed selectivity argument. 
309. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 601 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
310. See notes 242–246 and accompanying text. 
311. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573–74. 
312. Id. at 553–54.  
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B. The Arbitrariness of Categorical Exemptions 
Unfortunately, there is also little reason to believe that categorical 
exemptions are an adequate supplement to individualized sentencing. 
Existing exemptions do not protect all of the offenders likely to possess 
intellectual and psychological deficits akin to those of intellectually 
disabled and juvenile offenders. As evidenced by the nine percent of 
executed offenders with a sub-70 IQ score, existing exemptions are not 
even adequate to protect intellectually disabled offenders. Nor is there an 
adequate basis for treating intellectually disabled offenders differently 
than those with borderline intellectual functioning. Borderline 
intellectual functioning differs (often slightly) in degree, but people with 
it possess similarly diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, communicate, abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, engage in logical reasoning, control impulses, and 
understand the reactions of others.313 It is one thing to point out that a 
line needs to be drawn somewhere along the intellectual function 
spectrum and a different thing altogether to draw that line smack in the 
middle of the borderline mental deficiency range—especially when the 
features that define the range tend to be the opposite of those associated 
with the calculating nature of the prototypical death-eligible offender. 
The same problems are evidenced in the distinction between the 
seventeen-year-old offender ineligible for the death penalty and the 
twenty percent of offenders under the age of twenty-one—and thirty-six 
percent under twenty-five.314 Though seventeen-year-olds might possess 
more severe deficits than twenty-five-year-olds, each point along the 
youthfulness spectrum is associated with the type of impulsivity (among 
other functional deficits) associated with culpability that is diminished 
relative to the typical adult.315 
Even if the Court created categorical exemptions for intellectual 
impairments and youthfulness, these categorizations would generally 
arbitrarily exclude offenders who suffer from severe mental illness, 
childhood trauma, or both. What would happen if the Court created 
categorical exemptions for all defendants that belong to a class of 
offenders characterized by the type of diminished culpability possessed 
by intellectually disabled and juvenile offenders? At most, thirteen of the 
last one hundred executed offenders would remain; a number which 
suggests that the problems with capital punishment in America run far 
deeper than the creation of more categorical exemptions can repair. 
 313. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the characteristics of borderline 
intellectual functioning). 
314. See supra Tables 2, 3. 
315. See supra Table 4.  
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Conclusion 
This Article detailed the available social histories of the hundred most 
recently executed offenders. We found that the overwhelming majority of 
executed offenders suffered from intellectual impairments, were barely 
into adulthood, wrestled with severe mental illness, or endured profound 
childhood trauma. Most executed offenders fell into two or three of these 
core mitigation areas, all which are characterized by significant intellectual 
and psychological deficits. This ubiquity of mitigation evidence present in 
the social histories of executed offenders should give pause to those 
charged with assessing the proper functioning of the death penalty in 
America. Though we aimed only to take a first step toward correcting for 
the dearth of knowledge about the social histories of the people whom 
states execute, our project suggests the need for other scholars to conduct 
more comprehensive examinations of both the failings of the Court’s 
mitigation-facilitating doctrines as well as the implication for these deficits 
on the continued constitutionality of the death penalty. 
